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The Court's Memorandum Decision of May 8,2008, must be reheard because it exceeds 
the jurisdiction of the Court in re-determining matters not appealed, and holds, contrary to Utah 
law, that: 
L In an action in rem, an order to sell the res and to discharge from the proceeds 
documented sums paid to acquire or improve the res, is not final because it requires judicially 
supervised sale; 
2. No order entered upon stipulation is ever final, notwithstanding it disposes of all 
claims and precisely matches the recorded stipulation, and despite running of the time for appeal 
and for correction under Rule 60(b), because either party can always claim that it did not intend 
to stipulate; 
3. Anticipatory breach, preventing enforcement, may not be raised as a defense, but must 
be raised as a counterclaim; 
4. An amendment of pleadings, of right because it is timely, may be discretionarily 
denied if not otherwise "justified"; 
5. In an action for unlawful detainer, where the defense of anticipatory breach is 
adjudicated by an order denying enforcement of the contract and staying eviction proceedings 
pending completion of judicial sale, failure to vacate the subject premises and file, in violation of 
such order, a counterclaim for relief based upon anticipatory breach, retroactively waives the 
adjudicated right to relief based upon anticipatory breach; and 
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6. A contract interpreted to allow one party, by anticipatory breach, to force the other 
party into non-compliance, then demand relief for the coerced non-compliance, is not per se 
unconscionable. 
THE ESTABLISHED FACTS 
The Court has failed to comprehend the basic facts, including the procedural facts, 
though they are well established and plain on the face of the record. The result is decisions 
beyond the jurisdiction of the Court to make, and patently erroneous. The pertinent facts are as 
follows: 
In February, 2004, plaintiff-appellee anticipatorially breached the real estate sales 
contract between the parties, borrowing defendant-appellant's equity in the property, preventing 
re-finance. Unappealed Finding No. 12, Conclusion No. 31. 
Plaintiff then seized defendants' escrowed funds to make payments on the contract 
through June, 2004, then served a notice of default. Finding No. 10. 
Defendant discovered plaintiffs breach in attempting to respond to the notice of default. 
Plaintiff filed this unlawful detainer action in October, 2004. Finding No 25. 
Defendant's Answer promptly asserted the defense of anticipatory breach by denying that 
plaintiff owned the subject property or had any right of enforcement, and asserting that the title 
was held intrust for defendant. Answer, 1fl[ 2, 3. 
Plaintiff then stipulated to a settlement waiving enforcement and recognizing defendants' 
right to rescission and refund. Transcript, Brief, Ex. B. 
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Following hearing December 22, 2004, an Order was entered by the Court accordingly 
January 19, 2005, ordering that the property be sold and amounts paid in by defendant refunded 
from the proceeds, and staying any proceedings to evict defendant pending compliance. Order, 
1/19/05. 
Five months later, plaintiff sought vacation of the Order by motion under Rule 60, 
asserting that her stipulation was a mistake. 
The Order of January 19, 2005, was vacated by Order January 11,2006, upon the ground 
only that it had been "improvidently entered". Order 1/11/06, f 1. There is no finding that the 
Order of January 19,2005, was not final.1 
The Order of January 11, 2006, expressly preserves defendant's right to assert 
anticipatory breach thereafter, returning the parties to the status quo following the Answer. 
Order 1/11/06, f 3. This part of the latter Order was not appealed. 
Defendant, within 20 days of the latter order, February 2, 2006, filed amended pleadings, 
seeking jury trial. The District Court struck such amended pleadings as an exercise of discretion. 
Order 7/11/06. 
1
 A ruling October 28, 2005, that the Court could proceed under Rule 54(b) to consider 
whether to enforce "an alleged settlement agreement" does not suffice, because it contains no 
analysis or finding regarding the affect of the Order of January 19,2005. Re-casting plaintiffs 
motion to vacate an order as one about enforcing a settlement agreement merely side-stepped the 
issue of finality. As a result, the "evidentiary hearing" then held produced no evidence regarding 
finality. 
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The Court of appeals has now reversed the District Court's finding that defendant's 
remedies for anticipatory breach were limited to paying off plaintiff s improper lien and 
affirming the contract, by holding that defendant had the right to rescind and seek damages. 
FINAL JUDGMENT 
The Order in this case dated January 19, 2005, vacated upon application 5 months 
thereafter, is a final judgement, subject to Rule 60(b), U.R.CP. It fully satisfies the requirement 
that it dispose of the controversy between the parties, leaving nothing but enforcement. State ex 
rel B.B. ,45 P.3d 527, 530 (U. Apps. 2002), aff d 94 P.3d 252. An order in an action in rem 
disposing of claims to the res and ordering sale is always final under Utah law. Meagher v. 
Equity Oil Co., 299 R2d 827, 831 (Utah 1956). This is true notwithstanding the Order 
contemplates further activities in enforcement of the Order, since none of the activities 
contemplated could alter the basic disposition. Budinich v. Benton Dickinson & Co., 486 U.S. 
196, (1988) ("A final decision generally is one which ends the litigation on the merits and leaves 
nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment. A question remaining to be decided after 
an order ending litigation on the merits does not prevent finality if its resolution will not alter the 
order or moot or revise decisions embodied in the order." 486 U.S. at 199); Trujillo v. Hilton of 
Santa Fe, 851 P.2d 1064, 1064-65 (N.M. 1993); Lee v. GNLVCorp., 996 P.2d 416, 417 (Nev. 
2000). 
, . . when the decree decides the right to property in contest, and 
. . . directs it to be sold . . . and the claimant is entitled to have such decree 
carried immediately into execution, the decree must be regarded as a final one . . . 
Forgay v. Conrad, 47 U.S. 201,12 L.Ed. 404,406 (1848). 
A judgment is not less a judgment because based upon a stipulation. Rule 54(a), 
U.R.C.P., defines judgements as "entered upon trial, stipulation, motion or the Court's 
initiative". Whether a judgment is final depends upon objective analysis of its affect as written 
State ex rel B.B., supra; Powell v. Cannon, 598 Utah Adv. Rep. 31. In the obsence of 
ambiguity, this is not subject to what a party later asserts was his understanding. The rules 
regarding finality cannot be subverted by the transparent end-run employed in this case of 
claiming that a plain motion under Rule 60 to vacate a judgment entered upon stipulation is "a 
motion to enforce (or not) an alleged settlement agreement" under Rule 54. Ruling & Order 
10/28/05. Such devise does not allow a court to avoid an objective analysis of the plain affect of 
the order, and to resort for purposes of overturning the Order, to an untimely presentation of 
parol evidence regarding alleged negotiations resulting in the order. See Order 1/11/06. This 
Court would never sit still for such manipulation of a plain written contract. That it now does so 
regarding plain written orders sets a wholly pernicious precedent that any litigant who stipulates 
to a final judgment may attack the judgment in perpetuity by parol evidence regarding settlement 
negotiations. 
This was a proceeding in rem for the possession of and title to realty. The Court ordered 
the property sold, and the proceeds thereof paid to discharge "sums paid by defendant Hall for 
the purchase or improvement of the subject realty". Order, ff 3,4, 5. This fully disposed of the 
claims between the parties. It rejected FrancisconTs claims for enforcement and ownership, and 
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recognized Hall's right to rescission and refund. In an action in rem , disposal of the res of 
necessity disposes of the claims. For gay v. Conrad, supra. No other claims were pending 
between these parties. Plaintiff, upon so stipulating, sought return of her bond, and defendant 
agreed. Transcript, Brief, Ex. B, at 3. It is true that further actions were ordered to complete the 
sale. Order, ff 1,2. It is true that the parties were ordered to exchange records showing sums 
paid by Hall, and to "endeavor" to agree on the amount paid in by defendant. The sum, 
however, was determinable from available records, and not substantially disputed. Absent 
prompt agreement, moreover, the Court would fix the sum. Order f 1, ^ f 5. Thereafter, the 
property would be sold. Order, flf 3,4. The sale was not contingent upon an agreement. 
Nothing suggests that by refiising to agree either party could avoid the sale. The amount actually 
paid in by Hall was merely a floor on the restitution to which she was entitled: she was also 
entitled to a concomitant part of increase in market value, f 5. Offering price was to be 
determined by appraisal; but actual sale price was to be determined by the market upon 
"commercially reasonable sale", f 4. Nothing in the order incorporates a dispute regarding 
sums due Hall: it was agreed, and ordered, that she was to be recompensed documented sums 
actually paid, and that if the parties did not promptly agree on such sums, the Court would fix 
them. 
The suggestion that the Court continued the case so that the parties could negotiate a 
settlement is plainly false. The Court ordered a sale, disposing of the res and its proceeds. This 
wholly disposed of Francisconi's claim of enforcement, adopting instead Hall's assertion of 
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resulting trust and the defense of anticipatory breach underlying it. Nothing the parties were 
authorised to do thereafter could alter this disposition. There was nothing to negotiate, including 
the sum due defendant, which was simply no less than the documented sum she had paid in. 
The Order of January 19, 2005 exactly parallels those foreclosing mortgages and 
ordering judicial sale. The fact that sale proceedings occur after the order of foreclosure, or that 
they similarly require determination of any deficiency, never affects the finality of such orders. 
See e.g., Trujillo, supra, 851 P.2d 1065. It does not affect the finality of this order. The same 
rule applies in all actions determining title and ordering disposition of proceeds. For gay v. 
Conrad, supra; Meagher v. Equity Oil Co., 299 P.2d 827, 831 (Utah 1956). It has long, and 
generally, been recognized that an order disposing of title to property is final, notwithstanding it 
orders sale and further disposition of proceeds. E.g., Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 151 N.E. 610, 
611-12 (Ind. 1926) (a decree is final which decides rights of parties to property, notwithstanding 
it requires sale of the property thereafter); Watts v. Noble, 262 S.W. 1114,1115-16 (Ky. 1924) (a 
decree settling title and ordering land to be rented, disposition of rent to be determined, is final); 
State v. Mulloy, 15 S.W. 809, 812-13 (Mo. 1929) (judgement determining validity of liens and 
ordering sale of property to discharge them is final); Lanier v. Parnell, 190 S.W. 421, 422-23 
(Tex. 1945) (a decree determining title to cattle final, notwithstanding it did not dictate final 
disposition of the cattle, and further proceedings were necessary). See also Gazin v. Hieber, 504 
P.2d 1178, 1185 (Wash. App. 1972). The rule is specifically the law of Utah (Meagher v. Equity 
Oil Co., supra, 299 P.2d at 831 (Utah 1956)): 
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We regard the judgment, which is referred to as Interlocutory Judgement and 
Decree, signed by Judge Tuckett on December 13,1955, as interlocutory only in 
that it is necessary that there be an accounting as to the proceeds due plaintiffs in 
accordance with their interests and payment of the same. But such judgment is 
final insofar as it determines the rights of the parties hereto in the Sheridan lease. 
That the Court held further proceedings "in abeyance pending compliance with this 
Order", merely precluded further submissions in pursuit of an eviction. This specifically allows 
defendant to remain in place without rent. The Order is "pending compliance": nothing suggests 
that, following compliance, there could be any further proceedings respecting this res between 
these parties. Compliance utterly terminates the matter: there is nothing left to resume following 
this "continuance". 2Courts ordering judicial sales routinely retain jurisdiction through the date 
of sale to support the ruling. 
The bizarre notion that what is designated an "Order", signed by Judge Henriod January 
19, 2005, was really not an order, but reflects only an abortive attempt at settlement, confounds 
the remainder of the Court's analysis. Thus, the Order of January 19, 2005, is given no effect 
during its pendency of validating defendant-appellee's defense of anticipatory breach, or 
relieving defendant-appellant of obligation to make further payments. The Order is treated not 
2
 The Court's quotation from the transcript of 12/22/04 is perverse. Judge Henriod's 
remark "Appreciate your work in trying to resolve this", is plainly a reference to past "work", 
not to future negotiation. The remark follows immediately the statement "that will be the order", 
and is followed shortly by "let's memorialize the agreement today." The Court and parties could 
hardly memorialize today an "agreement" embodied in an "order" which had yet to be 
negotiated. 
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even as a subsequently vacated order, but as a nullity ab initio. This mistake invalidates the 
remainder of the Court's analysis. 
JURISDICTION ON APPEAL 
Treating the original order in this matter as not final is improper, but, ultimately, 
immaterial Even the subsequent order vacating the original order specifically preserves all of 
the rights of the parties preceding the original order: "Each party is fully entitled to pursue their 
legal rights and remedies with regard to the above - entitled action and the [subject] real property 
• . . " Order January 11, 2006. In addition to preserving a claim for rescission and damages, this 
specifically preserved the defense of anticipatory breach previously asserted in the matter. No 
one appealed this part of the second order, and it is beyond the jurisdiction of the Court of 
Appeals. 
Defendant then successfully prosecuted the defense of anticipatory breach. Plaintiff was 
proven not entitled to any payments she had not received. The contract was unenforceable by 
plaintiff from and after the anticipatory breach proven. Plaintiff owed defendant refund of 
payments collected thereafter. Plaintiff had no right to evict defendant, or to charge for her 
continued occupation. The finding of anticipatory breach also was not appealed, and not before 
the Court of Appeals. 
Notwithstanding the error in treating the initial order as not final, the only resolution 
available to the Court of Appeals following the proceedings which subsequently occurred, is 
reversal. The Court's present ruling that anticipatory breach entitled Hall to the remedy of 
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rescission and damages eliminates the District Court's ruling that Hall was limited to paying off 
Francisconi's improper lien and charging the costs against payments due from Hall. Since the 
latter part of the District Court's ruling cannot be sustained, nor the District Court's ruling 
preserving the defense of anticipatory breach altered, the sole permissible resolution on appeal is 
reversal of the final judgement. 
In short, this record contains unappealed rulings of the District Court, beyond the 
jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals to alter, that defendant could resume her defense of 
anticipatory breach, and that she did so successfully. This wholly eliminates any affirmance of 
the final ruling enforcing the contract on behalf of plaintiff. Such affirmance openly endorses 
ham-fisted gaming of the system to produce an unconscionable result. 
ANTICIPATORY BREACH 
The Court "assumes" that "Francisconi committed an anticipatory breach", presumably 
because the District Court so found, and, as that ruling was not appealed, it is final. 
Th Court then, however, purports to address "Hall's defense to Francisconi's unlawful 
detainer action based on anticipatory breach", while penalizing appellant for failure to file a 
complaint alleging breach and seeking enforcement or rescission and damages. The Court 
recites the tired canard often repeated in this case to denigrate appellant: "She continued to 
reside in the home for over two years without paying any rent." 3This is said to justify 
3
 Presumably, this is based upon the District Court's assertion, in a ruling July, 11, 2006, 
that "Defendant effectively concedes that she occupied the premises from April, 2004, to June 
14,2006 without making a single payment. . ." Defendant did not contest this statement 
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application of the rule that "acceptance or retention of benefits after the nonperformance . . . is a 
waiver of any right to consider such breach a discharge or release from the contract" Even the 
District Court's findings make clear at once that nothing of the sort happened. 
Plaintiff anticipatorially breached the parties' agreement in February, 2004, by imposing 
an improper lien which prevented defendant re-financing the property. Finding No. 12 , 
Conclusion No. 31. Of course, plaintiff did not advise defendant of the breach. Defendant 
made payments on the contract through June, 2004. Finding No. 10. Plaintiff then immediately 
took the steps to initiate an unlawful detainer action by serving a notice of default June 30, 2004. 
Finding No. 16. In attempting to comply with the notice, defendant discovered the facts relating 
to plaintiffs prior breach. Following an exchange of correspondence between counsel warning 
that an anticipatory breach may have occurred, this action was filed in October, 2004. Finding 
No. 25. By Answer, appellant denied appellee's assertion that she was entitled to enforce the 
agreement, by unlawful detainer or otherwise. Nothing more was required to assert the defense 
of anticipatory breach. In January, 2005, following a hearing in December, 2004, judgement 
was entered denying the enforcement sought by appellee, and requiring restitution of appellant's 
investment. The judgement correctly adjudicated the issue of anticipatory breach. 
because it was irrelevant to the proceeding then before the Court. From January 2005 to January 
2006, defendant was relieved of payments by an Order of the District Court. The District Court 
subsequently found anticipatory breach as of February, 2004, relieving defendant of any 
payments thereafter. Any non-payments between April, 2004 and June, 2006 are irrelevant. 
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It is black letter law that anticipatory breach prevents enforcement by the party in breach. 
Larson v. Kelly, 497 P.2d 239, 240 (Utah 1972); LHIW, Inc. v. De Lorean, 753 P2d. 961, 963 
(Utah 1988); Kim v. Park, 86 P.3d 63,65-66 (Or. Apps. 2004), reh. den 107 P.3d 26 . 
Anticipatory breach may be asserted by direct claim, or by defense in an action for enforcement. 
There is no rule that a party sued for enforcement despite a recent, and recently discovered, 
anticipatory breach by plaintiff, waives his rights because he didn't beat plaintiff to the court 
house. There is no requirement that he file a counterclaim. A party in anticipatory breach 
cannot erase the consequences of his misbehavior by filing for enforcement before his victim can 
obtain appropriate legal advice. There are no formal pleading requirements for the defense of 
anticipatory breach except to deny entitlement to the enforcement sought. 
Appellant plainly did NOT accept two years free rent while sleeping on her rights. No 
rent was due. The celerity with which the Court accepts and repeats this transparent falsehood is 
disturbing. The notion that if one occupies without rent upon obtaining a proper order, based 
upon actual anticipatory breach, that one may occupy without rent, one waives the right to assert 
the breach and occupy without rent, is circular nonsense. Appellant asserted her rights promptly, 
and successfully. That she did so by defense rather than claim is entirely irrelevant. She did 
everything the Court could now require her to have done. That she thereafter remained in the 
premises without further payment to appellee, as permitted by a standing order of the Court, 
cannot be the basis of a claim of waiver. 
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That the original judgment in this matter was subsequently vacated is wholly irrelevant. 
This merely left in place the defense of anticipatory breach, specifically preserved by the 
subsequent order and which the District Court subsequently validated. Neither of the latter 
rulings was appealed. This left nothing subject to decision by the Court of Appeals except the 
District Court's ruling that the contract limited appellee's remedies. While the Court is unable to 
sustain that ruling, its finding of waiver has precisely the same effect: appellant is improperly 
limited to correcting appellee's breach, affirming the contract, and seeking an offset. 
The payments the Court would now blame appellee for not making were never due 
because of Francisconi's anticipatory breach. The foregoing deals as well with the Court's 
assertion that the contract was not unconscionable. The contract as now enforced by the Court is 
unconscionable on its face. Under plain Utah law, a contract which allows one party to force 
another into breach, then take advantage of it, is unconscionable per se. Resource Management 
Co, v. Weston Ranch, 706 P.2d 1028,1040-47 (Utah 1985); Cahoon v. Cahoon, 641 P.2d 141, 
144 (Utah 1982); Ferris v. Jennings, 595 P.2d 857, 859 (Utah 1979). The Court does not escape 
the rule by declining to affirm the District Court's conclusion about exclusive remedies. The 
Court now holds, in reversing unappealed rulings of the District Court, that appellant could not 
defend appellee's enforcement action by her prompt assertion of appellee's ultimately 
adjudicated anticipatory breach. This is patently unconscionable. 
AMENDMENT 
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The Court's suggestion that, even if appellant's attempt to amend were timely, it could be 
discretionarily disallowed because the District Court "found that Hall lacked sufficient 
justification for obtaining leave to amend", violates Rule 15, U.R.C.P., on its face. If the attempt 
to amend was timely, no further justification was required. Rule 15(a), U.R.C.P. The Court 
cannot avoid by such a ruling the necessary conclusion that the attempt cannot have been 
rendered untimely by pendency of an order forbidding it. Not even statutes of limitation run 
during disabilities. This disposes as well of the Court's suggestion that the standard of review on 
this point was abuse of discretion. 
The amendment was timely. The District Court had no discretion. The Order entered 
January 11, 2005, in this matter erased all proceedings following the Answer, and allowed the 
parties to resume at that point. Any amendment within 20 days thereof was of right under Rule 
15. The District Court had no discretion to disallow an amendment. 
The imaginary 2 years of ignored payments ran from the District Court's order of 
January, 2005, until the District Court's Order of January, 2006. The first Order, freely 
stipulated by appellee, determined that no further payments were due. Appellant was in full 
compliance during pendency of that Order. Further, during that time the existing Order forbade 
appellant to file the claim the Court now says she had to file to preserve her right not to make 
further payments. Had such a claim then been filed, it would not have been docketed. 
The supposed two years were subject to an Order that no payments were due. The Order 
was entirely correct: appellee had anticipatorially breached the agreement, terminating any right 
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to further payments. The District Court subsequently found anticipatory breach, without appeal.4 
Now the Court holds that to preserve that entirely correct disposition, appellant had to violate the 
stay contained in the order by filing a claim which had been previously adjudicated. Surely, the 
Court cannot intend such an absurd Catch-22. 
The Court now holds that no judgment is final, notwithstanding running of the time for 
appeal and running of the limits set in Rule 60(b), so long as a party dissatisfied with it can 
thereafter convince a sympathetic judge that he really was sufficiently thoughtless as not to grasp 
the obvious affect of the order when rendered. Never mind that moving to vacate in such 
circumstances means movant must grasp the affect now . Indeed, under the Court's ruling, such 
a dissatisfied litigant, by waiting long enough to assert his misunderstanding of the order, can 
disenfranchise the opposition of its rights in the matter, by claiming delay during pendency of 
the Order in assertion of the opposition's rights, or even running of a statute of limitations. This 
principle could easily be extended to interpretation of contracts and other documents, rendering 
them utterly unreliable, and revolutionizing an entire field of law. 
The Memorandum Decision fundamentally departs from the central principle of law that 
documents, particularly judgments, are to be given their plain effect, without regard for 
subsequent claims of misunderstanding, It must be set aside. 
4
 This effectively eliminated the District Court's earlier ruling denying amendment 
because plaintiff could be prejudiced by delay because she had not been receiving payments for 
2 years. She could not be prejudiced by non-payments to which she was not entitled. 
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RESPECTFULLY submitted this 21st day of May, 2008. 
ECraigSmay 
Attorney for Defendar 
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